By tak ing se ri ous a re mark once made by Paul Bernays, namely that an account of the na ture of ra tio nal ity should be gin with con cept-for ma tion, this ar ti cle sets out to un cover both the re stric tive and the ex pan sive bound aries of ra tio nal ity. In or der to do this some im pli ca tions of the pe ren nial philosoph i cal prob lem of the "co her ence of irreducibles" will be re lated to the acknowl edge ment of prim i tive terms and of their indefinability. Some crit i cal re marks will be ar tic u lated in con nec tion with an over-es ti ma tion of ra tio nality -con cern ing the in flu ence of Kant's view of hu man un der stand ing as the for mal law-giver of na ture (the sup pos edly "ra tio nal struc ture of the world"), and the ap par ently in no cent (sub jec tiv ist) habit to re fer to ex pe ri en tial en tities as 'ob jects'. The other side of the coin will be high lighted with ref er ence to those kinds of knowl edge tran scend ing the lim its of con cept-for ma tioncul mi nat ing in for mu lat ing the four most ba sic idea-state ments phi los o phy can ar tic u late about the uni verse. What is found "in-be tween" these (re strictive) and (ex pan sive) boun d aries of ra tio nal ity will then briefly be placed within the con tours of a three fold per spec tive on the self-in suf fi ciency of logi cality -as merely one amongst many more di men sions con di tion ing human life. Al though the mean ing of the most ba sic log i cal prin ci ples -such as the log i cal prin ci ples of iden tity, non-con tra dic tion and suf fi cient rea sonwill sur face in our anal y sis, ex plor ing some of the com plex is sues in this respect, such as the re la tion ship be tween thought and lan guage, will not be ana lysed. The im por tant role of sol i dar ity -as the ba sis of cri tique -will be ex plained and re lated both to the role of im ma nent crit i cism in ra tio nal conver sa tion and the im por tance of ac knowl edg ing what is des ig nated as the prin ci ple of the ex cluded antinomy (which in an ontic sense un der lies the logi cal prin ci ple of non-con tra dic tion). The last sec tion of our discussion will suc cinctly il lu mi nate the proper place of the in ev i ta ble trust we ought to have in ra tio nal ity -while im plic itly warn ing against the ra tio nal is tic over-es ti mation of it (its de gen er a tion into a ra tio nal ist "faith in rea son"). Our in ten tion is to en hance an aware ness of the re al ity that ra tio nal ity is em bed ded in and bor ders on givens which are not open to fur ther "ra tio nal" ex plo ra tiongivens that both con di tion (in a con sti tu tive sense) and tran scend the lim its of con cep tual knowl edge. Some of the dis tinc tions and in sights op er a tive in our 
anal y sis are ex plained in Strauss 2000 and 2003 . Yet, most of the sys tem atic per spec tives found in this anal y sis of ra tio nal ity are only de vel oped in this ar ti cle for the first time. Since a dif fer ent study is re quired to dis cuss re lated prob lems and re sults found within cog ni tive sci ence, it can not be discussed within one ar ti cle.
Introductory remarks
In versely pro por tional to the fre quency of its em ploy ment are the at tempts to pro vide a truly pen e trat ing anal y sis of the mean ing, scope and lim i ta tions of ra tio nal ity as such.
Yet it is at least as sumed that ra tio nal agents are ca pa ble of rea son ing (ar gu men tation) and there fore of pro vid ing rea sons for con clu sions drawn. Some times it seems eas ier to look at prime ex am ples of ra tio nal ity, ex em pli fied in the leg acy of a spe cific dis ci pline, such as math e mat ics which used to be ap praised as the acme of sound reason ing. But, even in the case of math e mat ics the spectre of doubt and un cer tainty has en tered the scene.
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On the ba sis of a few his tori cal con tours it soon ap pears that there is an out stand ing mul ti fari ous ness evinced in "ra tion al ity." Against this back ground a number of re lated is sues will be ex plored and dis cussed.
Some historical contours
At the cra dle of the West ern leg acy of meta phys ics the Py thago re ans sought the core of ra tion al ity in the claim that the es sence of eve ry thing could be ex pressed in ar ithmeti cal terms. Their fa mous state ment is: "eve ry thing is number." The Py thago re ans surely dis cov ered the fun da men tal role of our con cept of number -some thing we still have to con cede af ter more than 2000 years. Cas sirer points out that amongst the "funda men tal con cepts of pure sci ence the con cept of number stands in the first place, both his tori cally and sys tem ati cally " (1953:27) . He fur ther more says that number en abled a con scious ness of the mean ing and value of the for ma tion of con cepts as such. With out number nei ther things as such nor their in ter re la tions would have been ac ces si ble to ra tional con tem pla tion. Yet the Py thago rean the sis went too far.
"The claim to grasp the sub stance of things in number has in deed been gradu ally with drawn; but at the same time the in sight that the sub stance of ra tio nal knowl edge is rooted in num ber, has been deep ened and clar i fied. Even when the meta physi cal kernel of the ob ject is no lon ger observed in the con cept of num ber, it re mains the first and tru est ex pres sion of ra tional method in gen eral. In it are di rectly reflected the differ ences in prin ci ple be tween the fun da men tal in ter pre ta tions of knowl edge. Through number the gen eral ideal of knowl edge gains a more defi nite form, in which for the first time it is de fined with full clar ity" (Cas sirer, 1953:27) .
The school of Parmenides, in spired by the im passe of the Py thago re ans mani fested in their dis cov ery of ir ra tional num bers (cf. Von Fritz, 1945) , switched to a dif fer ent ori en ta tion, for in terms of a static (spa tial) meta phys ics of be ing this school af firmed the iden tity of thought and be ing.
3 Yet, via the thought of Des cartes, Hob bes and Kant mod ern phi loso phy even tu ally wit nessed the re newed at tempt to com plete the cir cle when He gel took logic and dia lec tics no longer as an in stru ment to know re al ity, but rather to con tain it in its full ness and to tal ity -from whence it was brought forth. Hegel be lieved that this is the point where his "Wis sen schaft der Logic" is lo cated. 4 The long-standing im age of "uni ver sal rea son" in the course of the fur ther de vel opment of West ern phi loso phy in creas ingly ex pe ri enced the chal lenge of the dis in te grating ef fect of di verg ing and of ten con tra dict ing quali fi ca tions. Just think about quali fica tions such as "dia lec ti cal" rea son (Hera cli tus, Nicho las of Cusa, He gel, Marx, Simmel, Dahren dorff), in tui tive rea son (Plato, Husserl, Weyl) , "(self-)con tem pla tive reason" (Ar is totle), "pure" rea son, "theo reti cal" rea son, "prac ti cal" rea son (Kant), "histori cal" rea son (Dilthey, Troeltsch), "in ter pre ta tive" rea son (the her me neu ti cal tra dition: Hei deg ger, Gada mer), "trust wor thy" rea son (Pop per, Steg mül ler), "silly" rea son (Théve naz), "em bod ied rea son" (Lakoff and John son) , and many more.
The basic concerns of a reflection on rationality
The quest to un der stand ra tion al ity is em bed ded in re lated is sues, such as whether or not only hu man be ings are ra tional, whether or not the think ing pro cesses in volved in rea son ing are tak ing place with or with out the em ploy ment of lan guage (the ques tion con cern ing the re la tion ship of thought and lan guage in gen eral). These is sues on the one hand bor der on con sid era tions within the do main of philo sophi cal an thro pol ogy and on the other are in ti mately re lated to the in tri ca cies of ra tion al ity evinced in the inevi ta ble hu man urge to con ceive, con cep tu al ize, ar gue and un der stand. Yet only some of these con cerns will be ad dressed within the lim ited scope of this ar ti cle.
It is sig nifi cant that Paul Ber nays, the co-worker of the fore most mathe ma ti cian of the 20th cen tury, David Hil bert, in his con tri bu tion to the Fest schrift of Karl Pop per re marks that any ac count of ra tion al ity has to pay at ten tion to concept-formation. He states that the "proper char ac ter is tic of ra tion al ity" is "to be found in the con cep tual ele ment " (1974: 601) .
Phi loso phers, spe cial sci en tists and peo ple en gaged in eve ry day af fairs with out any hesi ta tion con stantly speak about "con cepts". Yet it is not easy for them to ex pli cate what con cepts are all about. Most of the time they do not have a con cept of a con cept! 5 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22( 
The limits of concept-formation and definition
Think ing about the na ture and role of con cepts soon bor ders on the lim its of ra tion ality. Vari ous dis ci plines in the course of their de vel op ment had to re al ize (and con cede) that the truly ba sic terms of their dis ci plines are con cep tu ally in de fin able. Se man tics as a sub-discipline of gen eral lin guis tics had to ac cept 'mea ning' as such a primi tive term. For ex am ple, when the dis tinc tion drawn by Im manuel Kant be tween ana lytic and syn thetic propo si tions (cf. Kant 1787:10 ff.) is pur sued, an at tempt can be made to de fine a typi cal se man tic phe nome non such as syn on ymy in terms of ana ly ticity. Two sen tences have the same mean ing only if each one of them en tails the other one in an ana lytic sense. Yet Quine high lighted the cir cu lar ity of such an at tempt. Because ana ly tic ity is de fined in terms of mean ing (a sen tence is sup posed to be ana lytically true if it is true only on the ba sis of its mean ing), whereas mean ing (in this case: simi lar ity of mean ing = syn on ymy) is de fined in terms of ana ly tic ity. Fo dor pro vides a sum mary con clu sion:
The goal we have been pur su ing is the tra di tional one of re duc ing mean ing to some more ba sic and bet ter un der stood en tity. But ana ly tic ity is too in ti mately re lated to mean ing to pro vide such a re duc tion. In fact, as far as any one knows, there is no meaning-independent way of char ac ter iz ing ei ther ana ly tic ity or mean ing (Fo dor, 1977:43) . Simi lar to the way in which lin guis tics had to ac cept (as sume) "mean ing" as something ba sic and primi tive, axio matic set the ory also had to ac cept primi tive terms. For ex am ple, within Zermelo-Fraenkel set the ory, "ele ment of" is in tro duced as a primi tive term 6 -and Gö del once re marked that as yet we do not have a sat is fac tory noncircular defi ni tion of the term "set."
7 Rus sell, in his lo gi cis tic ap proach to mathe matics, claims that his class con cept is purely logi cal in na ture, with out re al iz ing the circu lar ity en tailed in his ar gu men ta tion.
8 David Hil bert points at the cir cu lar ity en tailed in the lo gi cist at tempt to de duce the quan ti ta tive mean ing of number from that of the logical-analytical mode. In his Ge sam melte Ab hand lun gen Hil bert writes:
Only when we ana lyze at ten tively do we re al ize that in pre sent ing the laws of logic we al ready had to em ploy cer tain ar ith meti cal ba sic con cepts, for ex am ple the con cept of a set and par tially also the con cept of number, par ticu larly as car di nal number [An zahl]. Here we end up in a vi cious cir cle and in or der to 6 In ad di tion to prim i tive sym bols taken from logic the only set the o ret i cal prim i tive sym bol em ployed by Zermelo-Fraenkel set the ory is the bi nary pred i cate ep si lon which de notes the mem ber ship re la tion (cf. Fraenkel et al., 1973:22-23) . 7 "The op er a tion 'set of x's' (where the vari able 'x' ranges over some given kind of ob jects) can not be defined sat is fac to rily (at least not in the pres ent state of knowl edge), but can only be para phrased by other ex pres sions in volv ing again the con cept of set, such as: 'mul ti tude of x's', 'com bi na tion of any num ber of x's', 'part of the to tal ity of x's', where a 'mul ti tude' ('com bi na tion', 'part') is con ceived of as some thing which ex ists in it self no mat ter whether we can de fine it in a fi nite num ber of words (so that ran dom sets are not ex cluded)" (Gödel, 1964:262) . 8 "1 + 1 is the num ber of a class w which is the log i cal sum of two classes u and v which have no com mon terms and have each only one term. The chief point to be ob served is, that log i cal ad di tion of num bers is the fun da men tal no tion, while ar ith met i cal ad di tion of num bers is wholly sub se quent" (Rus sell, 1956:119) . Rus sell speaks about the sum of "two" classes where each of them con tains "one" el e ment. This pre sup poses an in sight into the quan ti ta tive mean ing of the num bers "1" and "2"! Con se quently, the num ber "2," which had to ap pear as the re sult of "log i cal ad di tion," is pre sup posed by it! avoid para doxes it is nec es sary to come to a par tially si mul ta ne ous de vel opment of the laws of logic and arith metic (1970:199) .
Singh also states that Rus sell's at tempt makes him a vic tim of the "vi cious cir cle princi ple " (1985:76) and the same criti cism is raised by Cas sirer: "Now if we take this process of pos it ing (Setzung) and dif fer en tia tion as a ba sis, we have done noth ing but presup pose number in the sense of the or di nal the ory " (1953:51) . An other ex am ple of the ne ces sity of ac knowl edg ing primi tive terms is found in Zeno's ar gu ments against mul ti plic ity and move ment. The so lu tion of Zeno's prob lem of Achil les and the tor toise is not merely given in the claim that Zeno un der stood the "mov ing ob server" meta phor in a lit eral way (see Lakoff and John son, 1999:157-158) , since what is ul ti mately shown by this "an tin omy" is that it is not pos si ble to de fine uni form mo tion ex haus tively in spa tial terms.
9 Simi larly, the domi nant mecha nis tic and physi cal is tic trends in mod ern bi ol ogy are not sen si tive to the in de fin abil ity of the bi otic mode (as pect or func tion) of re al ity. Vi tal is tic, 10 ho lis tic and or gan is mic theories 11 are in deed open to this state of af fairs.
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Hans Jonas strik ingly typi fies the mo nis tic forms of vi tal ism and mechani cism. Unlike du al ists, mo nists do not at tempt to re duce re al ity philo sophi cally to two fun da mental prin ci ples, but rather posit a sin gle all-inclusive and uni ver sally ex plana tory prin ciple. We may there fore just as well speak about pan-vitalism and pan-mechanicism. The ini tial hulèzoism (zoè = life; hulè = mat ter) of Greek phi loso phy comes to ex pression in one of the in di rectly pre served apho risms of Thales: eve ry thing lives. From this per spec tive it is uni mag in able that 'life' may not be the uni ver sal rule. Jonas com ments:
In such a world view death is a rid dle con front ing one, a con tra dic tion of the natu ral, self-explanatory and un der stand able, of the com mon life (1973:20) .
Jonas here discusses pan-vitalism and the prob lem of death (1973:19ff) . Pan-mechanistical think ers, on the other hand, em pha size the no tion that liv ing phe nom ena are pe riph eral in an en com pass ing ho mo ge ne ous physi cal world. Quan ti ta tively neg li gible in the im meas ur able ex panse of cos mic mat ter, quali ta tively an ex cep tion to the rule of ma te rial char ac ter is tics, sci en tifi cally in ex pli ca ble in an ex pli ca ble physi cal natu ral real ity, "life" be comes an in sur mount able ob sta cle for pan-mechanicism: Philos. 2003, 22(3) 251 9 The third B Frag ment pre served from Zeno first grants the re al ity of move ment but then im me di ately can cels it again by rais ing two op tions de ny ing it: "Some thing mov ing nei ther moves in the space it occu pies, nor in the space it does not oc cupy". 10 It should not be sur pris ing that later rep re sen ta tives of neo-vi tal ism stopped to use the ex pres sion "vi tal force" so dom i nant in vitalistic thought since Ar is totle in tro duced the no tion of an "entelechie." The latter was sup posed to be im ma te rial, con tra dict ing the term "force" used in the ex pres sion vi tal force. Heitler, for ex am ple, sim ply pre fers to re fer to a "cen tral in stance" (Zentral instanz) (1976:6). 11 Von Bertalanffy high lights the lim i ta tions of a physicalist ap proach: "These [bio chem i cal -DFMS] processes, it is true, are dif fer ent in a liv ing, sick or dead dog; but the laws of phys ics do not tell a dif ference, they are not in ter ested in whether dogs are alive or dead. This re mains the same even if we take into ac count the lat est re sults of mo lec u lar bi ol ogy. One DNA mol e cule, pro tein, en zyme or hor monal pro cess is as good as an other; each is de ter mined by phys i cal and chem i cal laws, none is better, health ier or more nor mal than the other" (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:146; cf. Strauss, 2002:168-170) . 12 Those bi ol o gists who fur ther ex plored the neo-vi tal ism of Hans Driesch had to ad just their ori en ta tion af ter von Bertalanffy gen er al ized the sec ond main law of ther mo dy nam ics to cover open sys tems as well -com pare the way in which Rainer Schu bert-Soldern in tro duced an "in sta bil ity fac tor" in or der to account for the health (bi oti cal sta bil ity!) of liv ing en ti ties (see Schu bert-Soldern, 1959 and 1962).
Life as prob lem here in di cates rec og ni tion of its strange ness in the me chani cal world, which is the real world; to ex plain it means -on this level of the uni versal on tol ogy of death -to deny it, re duc ing it to a vari ant of the pos si bil ity of the life less (1973:23) . This para graph explains pan-mechanism and the prob lem of life (1973:22ff) .
Whereas bio logi cal physi cal ism (with the neo-Darwinian the ory as one of its dominant rep re sen ta tives) aims at re duc ing the bi oti cal as pect of re al ity to com plex ma te rial struc tures and pro cesses, bio logi cal ho lism aims at the op po site ex treme. Need ham gives the fol low ing ex pla na tion of the po si tion taken by Meyer:
Thus Meyer, in his in ter est ing dis cus sion of the con cept of whole ness, maintains that the fun da men tal con cep tions of phys ics ought to be de duci ble from the fun da men tal con cep tions of bi ol ogy; the lat ter not be ing re duci ble to the former. Thus en tropy would be, as it were, a spe cial case of bio logi cal dis organi za tion; the un cer tainty prin ci ple would fol low from the psy cho-phys i cal rela tion; and the prin ci ple of rela tiv ity would be de riv able from the re la tion between or gan ism and en vi ron ment (Need ham, 1968:27, note 34). When ever an at tempt is made to de fine what is truly prim i tive (and ir re duc ible), the inev i ta ble out come is (antinomic) re duc tion. Historicism dem on strates this claim in a very lu cid way.
The his tori cis tic as ser tion "eve ry thing is his tory" elimi nates the mean ing of his tory, since only what ever is not it self his tori cal in na ture can have a his tory. If law, mo rality, art, and re lig ion are noth ing but his tory, then noth ing can have a his tory (in prin ciple can cell ing the pos si bil ity of some thing like le gal his tory, eco nomic his tory and relig ious his tory).
Within the sci ence of law Po lak at tempted to de fine 'law': ac cord ing to him law is an ob jec tive, trans-egoistic har moni za tion of in ter ests. Since this 'def in ition' does not con tain any thing spe cific be long ing to the ju ral it misses the tar get -'o bje ctive' intends some thing inter-subjective or uni ver sal (not dis tinc tively ju ral); trans-egoistic has an ethi cal mean ing; 'ha rmon iz ation' stems from the aes thetic do main and 'i nte rests' are non-specific and in need of a fur ther quali fi ca tion (such as "eco nomic in ter ests," "so cial in ter ests," and so on). The re sult is sim ply a rule equally well ap pli ca ble to the dis tri bu tion of alms amongst the poor, as Dooyeweerd aptly re marks (1967:9) .
In gen eral we can there fore con clude that concept-formation and defi ni tion ul timately rests upon the ac cep tance and em ploy ment of primi tive terms. In or der to avoid a re gre suus in in fi ni tum this state of af fairs ought to be re spected. Cas sirer writes:
For a criti cal analy sis of knowl edge, in or der not to ac cept a re gres sus in in fi nitum, has to stop at spe cific origi nal func tions which are not in need of genu ine deri va tion and which is also not ca pa ble of it (1957:73).
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What we have learned from these ex am ples is that the key terms in volved in ra tio nal (con cep tual) un der stand ing are them selves not open to (ra tio nal) con cep tual def i nition. Ra tio nal ity in this sense does rest upon a non-ra tio nal (or: more than ra tio nal) basis -but it should not be con fused with some thing ir ra tio nal. We may des ig nate this ba sis of ir re duc ible prim i tives as the re stric tive bound ary of ra tio nal ity. As such it reflects a pos i tive aware ness of one of the most fun da men tal pe ren nial is sues in phi los ophy: the quest to ac count for the co her ence of irreducibles (and: 'indefinables').
Rationality: the legacy of an over-estimated conceptual knowledge How ever, un able to over see its own com mit ment to rea son, mod ern phi loso phy pursued the pre ten sion of "uni ver sal rea son" which led to the mod ern ist En light en ment con vic tion that the world it self has a "ra tional struc ture." In or der to elu ci date this legacy closer at ten tion to the na ture of concept-formation is re quired.
14 The leg acy of West ern philo soph i cal re flec tion high lights that con cept-for ma tion is made pos si ble by two cru cial con di tions: (i) uni ver sal ity and (ii) the ca pac ity to bring to gether (syn the size) a log i cally objectified mul ti plic ity of traits into the unity of a concept.
A con cept is not sim ply a pic ture or an im age of some thing within re al ity or of some fea tures of re al ity. In or der to dis cern and iden tify, given pos si bili ties of re al ity are ana lyti cally opened up and deep ened through logi cal acts of a know ing sub ject. Opening up the "iden ti fi abil ity" and "dis tin guisha bil ity" of fea tures of re al ity is only pos sible through (sub jec tive) acts of ob jec ti fi ca tion. Through logi cal ob jec ti fi ca tion concepts emerge as the uni fi ca tion (bring ing to gether, syn the siz ing) of a mul ti plic ity of uni ver sal traits. The scope of a con cept is uni ver sal in the sense that it ap plies to whatever con forms to the con di tions in tended by the con cept con cerned. A proper con cept of a planet, a house, a chair, a hu man be ing, and so on makes it pos si ble to place any in di vid ual planet, house, chair or hu man be ing within the (uni ver sal) cate gory of planets, houses, chairs or hu man be ings.
Karl Mann heim ac counts for this in sight in the uni ver sal ity of con cepts in his own way:
Eve ry thing sub ject to as ser tion is to be iden ti cal for eve ry one in every as ser tion of it: and the con cept thus [must be] uni ver sally valid in two ways: ref er able to all ob jects of the same kind (the con cept 't able' is thus ap pli ca ble to all ta bles that have ever ex isted or ever will ex ist), and valid for all sub jects who ever will ut ter it, and who ac cord ingly al ways un der stand the same thing by 't able'. That this ten dency in heres in every concept-formation can not be doubted; and the crea tion of such a con cep tual plane upon which one con cept can be de fined by oth ers, with all con cepts thereby form ing an ob jec tive self-contained sys tem, should not be de nied (1982:196) .
What is known as Kant's so-called 'C ope rn ican' revo lu tion in epis te mol ogy -in as cribing the pri macy no longer to the 'o bject' but to the (for mal law-giving) sub ject 15 -re inforced the no tion of things within na ture as 'o bjects'. Some one in clined to de fend the neu tral ity of ob ser va tion nor mally would be will ing to ac cept as the most gen eral observation-term the no tion of an 'o bject': all the dif fer ent things in na ture are to be seen as 'o bjects'. How ever, this observation-term in it self dis plays the tre men dous subjec tiv is tic as sump tion so deeply im preg nated in our West ern no tion of sci ence -as such caus ing the in abil ity to ap praise things in na ture as genu ine sub jects, i.e. as be ing (in ad di tion to other kinds of laws -such as quan ti ta tive laws, spa tial laws and kinematic laws of mo tion) sub jected to physi cal laws for their ex is tence as ma te rial things.
In so far as physi cal en ti ties are ma te rial they are not ob jects but sub jects (sub ject to physi cal laws), and in so far as they are ob jects they are con sid ered ac cord ing to some or other non-physical trait -for ex am ple as some thing per ceived (sense-object), as some thing ana lyzed (iden ti fied and dis tin guished from some thing else -log i cal-an alyt i cal ob ject), as some thing bought or sold (eco nomic ob ject), and so on. There fore, al though things such as these could be ob jec ti fied by hu mans, this ob jec ti fi ca tion presupposes their pri mary ex is tence as (physi cal) sub jects. Speak ing about them in all pos si ble con texts as ob jects sim ply un der scores the pow er ful sub jec tiv is tic (humancentred) leg acy op era tive in West ern think ing. 16 Logi cal ob jec ti fi ca tion, as a sub jec tive ana lyti cal act of iden ti fi ca tion and dis tinguish ing, does not leave "re al ity" un touched -it opens up and deep ens its mean ing. Yet concept-formation does not ex haust the mean ing of knowl edge. The mis taken assump tion that knowl edge co in cides fully with con cep tual knowl edge, which dates back to Ar is totle and Greek meta phys ics, can best be des ig nated as ra tion al is tic. Ration al ism ac cen tu ates uni ver sal ity at the cost of in di vidu al ity -and thereby sim ply can cels the knowl edge we have of what ever is unique, con tin gent and in di vid ual. Concepts are blind to what are unique, con tin gent and in di vid ual -yet it can not be de nied that we do have knowl edge of what is unique, con tin gent and in di vid ual.
Concept-transcending knowledge
The kind of knowl edge in volved in ap proxi mat ing what is unique, con tin gent and in divid ual tran scends the lim its of concept-formation and should be ac knowl edged for what it is: concept-transcending knowl edge. Ni co lai Hart mann once ex plained the Kan tian no tion of a "Grenzbe griff" 17 in a strik ing way. He says that the no tion of an un know able "thing-in-itself" ("Ding an sich") still re quires a thought-form through which it is thought of as un know able -and this is what a "Grenzbe griff" in tends to cap ture. 18 With out buy ing into the role of the so-called "thing-in-itself" in the phi losophy of Kant (cf. the criti cal re marks made in Strauss, 1982:133, 141-143) , it is im portant to leave room for a "form-of-thinking" ac count ing for knowl edge tran scend ing the lim its of concept-formation.
The ba sic no tion with which Ar is totle started in his work on Cate go ries is that of the pri mary sub stance -which was sup posed to be strictly in di vid ual. In or der to safeguard the pos si bil ity of con cep tual knowl edge, Ar is totle had to in tro duce the so-called sec on dary sub stance, the to ti èn einai (De An ima, 412 b 16; cf. 414 a 9-11 and Metaph. 1035 b 32). 19 Ac cord ing to Ar is totle a con cept is al ways in volved in con ceiving what is gen eral (uni ver sal). 20 For Ar is totle true knowl edge is there fore al ways knowl edge of the uni ver sal form. The coun ter pole of form, namely mat ter (which lacks any posi tive de ter mi na tion -cf. Metaph. 1029 a 20-26) is there fore out side the reach of con cep tu ali za tion. As such it is un know able.
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The uni ver sal sub stan tial form in Ar is totle's thought is in tended to make the transcen dent eidè of Plato im ma nent -in her ing within con cretely ex ist ing sub stances. It re lates to the being-this or being-that. For ex am ple, Ar is totle holds that a con cept (logos) is not sub ject to com ing into be ing and pass ing away. It is not "house-ness" that comes into be ing, but only this house (Metaph. 1039 b 22-26).
These two stances, Plato with his tran scen dent eidè and Ar is totle with his im ma nent uni ver sal sub stan tial forms (sec on dary sub stances), in formed the me die val specu la tion about the uni ver sa lia ante rem (tran scen dent, seated in the "di vine Mind" a la Plato) and in re (in her ing within the cre ated en ti ties as their uni ver sal forms -a la Ar is totle). The ad di tional step in this re al is tic meta phys ics is given in the pos tu la tion of uni versal ity within the hu man mind, uni ver sa lia post rem. It also un der lies the re al is tic (copy) the ory of truth: truth is the cor re spon dence be tween thought and be ing (adequa tio in tel lec tus et rei).
Ar is totle ac tu ally dis cov ered the (uni ver sal) or der li ness (law ful ness) of en ti ties within re al ity, whereas Plato wres tled with the (uni ver sal) or der for con cretely ex isting en ti ties. The con di tions for be ing an atom are given as the or der for the ex is tence of any given atom -the lat ter evinces that it is sub ject to these con di tions (to this law for being-an-atom) in its or der li ness, i.e. in its being-an-atom.
How ever, dur ing and af ter the Ren ais sance the late Scho las tic nomi nal is tic movement (John the Scott, Wil liam of Oc cam) radi cally ques tioned Plato's eidè as well as Ar is totle's uni ver sal sub stan tial forms. The nomi nal is tic ori en ta tion ac tu ally de nies both the or der for and the or der li ness of en ti ties and ac cepts uni ver sal ity only within the hu man mind -as it is clearly seen from the new con cept of truth which it em ploys: truth no longer re lates to a re al ity out side the hu man mind, but only con cerns the compati bil ity of con cepts within the hu man mind. How ever, the re mark able fact is that both the tra di tional Scho las tic meta phys ics and the mod ern nomi nal is tic re ac tion to it con tinue to ad here to the ra tio n al is tic re stric tion of knowl edge to what is uni ver sal! Even Scho las ti cism was faith ful to the con vic tion that what ever is in di vid ual is in expressi ble (omne in di vi duum est in ef fa bile). It will suf fice to quote a well-informed and re spect able 20 th cen tury phi loso pher from South Af rica in or der to il lus trate the longstanding in flu ence of this ra tion al is tic re stric tion of knowl edge to con cep tual knowledge. De Vlee schau wer wrote a work on logic and epis te mol ogy and ex plic itly points at the "in di vid ual de limi ta tion " (1952:213) . He men tions the do main of the "in di vidual" as one where our in tel lec tual ca paci ties must fail. Ap par ently with out be ing aware of it, De Vlee schau wer ad heres to the nominalistic per spec tive which holds that in real ity there are only in di vid ual things and pro cesses, clearly seen in his ex pla na tion that in spite of all simi lari ties be tween en ti ties and pro cesses, there will al ways re main an ir re duci ble ker nel of in di vidu al ity, which causes one thing to be dif fer ent from an other one. Sci ence with its di rect ed ness to wards the uni ver sal has se ri ous dif fi cul ties with its in cli na tion also to know what is in di vid ual -be cause "knowl edge of what is in di vid ual is sim ply im pos si ble" -some thing about which phi loso phy, ac cord ing to De Vleeschauwer, had clar ity since its in cep tion.
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Given the aware ness em pha sized by many con tem po rary think ers that we can not deny die his tori cal and lin guis tic con di tions of be ing hu man one may ex pect phi losophers to be skep ti cal or at least criti cal in re spect of the ac know ledge ment of uni versal ity. As a stance against the long-standing domi na tion of ra tion al is tic no tions this reac tion is un der stand able. Yet one should not throw out the baby with the bath wa ter, for ac knowl edg ing his toric ity and lin guis ti cal ity does not ex clude but rather presuppose logi cal ity. Those (post mod ern) think ers in clined to deny uni ver sal ity abundantly dem on strates this point, be cause the best they man age to ac com plish is to re ject uni ver sal ity in the name of uni ver sal ity. Van Huys steen, for ex am ple, writes: "Postmod er nity chal lenges us to deal with the fact that we have been robbed of any gen eral, uni ver sal, or ab stract ways to talk about the re la tion ships be tween re lig ion and sci ence to day" (1998:2-3). The key word is "any": it op er ates as the uni ver sal quan ti fier of his state ment, en tail ing that the propo si tion in terms of which "gen eral, uni ver sal, or abstract ways" are ques tioned cru cially de pends upon the uni ver sal ity of its own claim.
What is re quired is not a de nial of the co-determining role of logi cal ity along side his toric ity and lin guis ti cal ity, but an ac know ledge ment of the in evi ta ble and in es capable role also played by the logical-analytical di men sion of be ing hu man, ac com panied by the criti cal in sight that one should not suc cumb to the ra tion al is tic re stric tion of knowl edge to (uni ver sal) con cep tual knowl edge.
At this point we may link our ini tial analy sis of "primi tive terms" with the na ture of concept-transcending knowl edge.
The origi nal on tic do mains of "primitive-ness" in which ir re duci ble ba sic terms find their seat have a fur ther fun da men tal and com ple men tary side to them. In or der to high light this side we have to ref er to con cep tual clus ters and the dif fer ent on tic domains to which this com ple men tary side re late (cf. Strauss, 2002:170) .
Re mark: A ra tion al is tic leg acy in eve ry day lan guage
The use of the term "ontic" instead of "on to log i cal" finds its ground in the crucial dis tinc tion be tween what is given and what is the re sult of re flec tion on what is given. Liv ing en ti ties, such as plants, an i mals and hu man be ings are not bi o log i cal phe nom ena as we are ac cus tomed to hear. They are sim ply alive and there fore at most the da tum with which the dis ci pline of bi ol ogy may con cern it self. Sim i larly, a young cou ple tak ing a ro man tic walk on a cam pus is not a so cio log i cal phe nom e non but sim ply a so cial one. The ra tio nal is tic leg acy, which iden ti fies our abil ity to know with re al ity it self -ev i denced in the mentioned be lief in the "ra tio nal (math e mat i cal) struc ture" of re al ity -is re spon sible for this iden ti fi ca tion of dif fer ent kinds of phe nom ena with the o ret i cal think ing about them, thus lead ing to the prac tice to em ploy words with the suffix "-logy" where they do not fit -like on to log i cal instead of ontic, bi o log i cal instead of bi otic and so cio log i cal instead of so cial.
It will suf fice to use the fol low ing do mains: (i) the ar ith met i cal do main, (ii) the spa tial do main, (iii) the kinematical do main, and (iv) the phys i cal do main, while keep ing in mind that the con crete ex is tence of no sin gle en tity, pro cess or so ci etal col lec tivi ty is ex hausted by any one of these (or other) ontic spheres or as pects of re al ity. For ex ample, the ex is tence of a chair is not ex hausted by its func tion in the quan ti ta tive facet of re al ity -ev i dent in our dis cern ment of its num ber of legs -since it also ex ists as a spatially ex tended en tity with its rel a tive move ment (around the axis of the earth, around the sun) and with its rel a tive phys i cal strength (suit able for a nor mal hu man be ing to sit on). Ap ply ing our in tui tions of number, space, move ment and energy-operation in talking about the nu meri cal prop er ties of a chair, about its size and shape (spa tial), about its rela tive speed and about its physi cal char ac ter is tics, in every in stance in evi ta bly em ploys no tions or terms with a uni ver sal scope. This means that when ever any person looks through these dif fer ent (on tic) points of en try (which are then at once elevated to epis temic modes of ex pla na tion) at a chair, the terms gen er ated are used in a con cep tual way. As long as we re strict the use of such terms to the re spec tive on tic domains (modes of ex pla na tion) this con cep tual fo cus will al ways be pres ent -which is ac tu ally the case with all our entitary-oriented eve ry day con cepts (just think about the con cepts we have of en ti ties such as those men tioned in an ear lier con text: plan ets, houses, chairs and hu man be ings). If we des ig nate such func tional terms em ployed in de scrib ing the way in which en ti ties func tion within vari ous as pects of re al ity as modal terms (see Strauss, 2000:26-28, 32-36) , 23 then the fol low ing dis tinc tion should be drawn. When mo dal terms are used to ref er to en ti ties that func tion within the con fines of par ticu lar modes of be ing, they are em ployed in a con cep tual man ner. How ever, when ever a mo dal term is put in serv ice of re fer ring be yond the lim its or bounda ries of such an on tic do main, then we en coun ter a concept-transcending use of such a termalso des ig nated as an idea-use of such terms.
For ex am ple, while merely ex plor ing our quan ti ta tive in tui tion, one can speak about a chair in its to tal ity, in clud ing all its prop er ties. In lan guage this is ex pressed by re ferring to its in di vidu al ity, its unique ness, its be ing dis tinct. The origi nal quan ti ta tive mean ing of number -cap tured as a "primi tive" in axio matic set the ory as we have seen 24 -is evi dent in these af firma tions and yet they are in tended to ref er to much more than the mere ar ith meti cal as pect of the chair. They there fore in deed con sti tute idea-usages of mo dal nu meri cal terms.
Simi larly, instead of speak ing about the sizes and di men sions of a chair, one may use our in tui tion of the origi nal mean ing of spa tial ex ten sion to speak about all fac ets of the chair -in which case one may ref er to the chair in its to tal ity. 25 Once again it is clear that the term to tal ity -in spite of its spa tial de scent -here re fers to much more than merely the spa tial as pect of the chair. It con sti tutes there fore -in terms of the distinc tion sug gested by us con cern ing the two fold us age of mo dal terms -an other ex ample of an idea-use of mo dal terms, in this case spa tial ones.
Mod ern phoronomy (pure sci ence of move ment) un der stands mo tion in its origi nal sense as uni form flow, with out the need of any causes (as Ar is totle be lieved). This kine matic in tui tion of con stancy, when used in an idea-context, pro vides us with the idea-knowledge of the iden tity of an en tity -its rela tive con stancy amidst all changeswhere the lat ter term finds its seat in the physi cal as pect of energy-operation. The opera tion of en ergy al ways causes cer tain ef fects and in that sense never leaves any thing the same, i.e., iden ti cal. There fore, the word change can also be em ployed in an ideacontext. But be cause the idea-meaning of con stancy (con so nant with the idea of identity) and the idea-use of change stem from two ir re duci ble modes (de tect ing changes al ways pre sup poses con stancy), it is not con tra dic tory to use both these ideas.
Ex pand ing our view we can even high light the four most ba sic idea-statements philoso phy can for mu late about the uni verse -and once again we have to re al ize that these state ments are not con tra dict ing each other but rather en tail and com ple ment each other: (i) eve ry thing is unique; (ii) eve ry thing co heres with eve ry thing else; (iii) eve ry thing re mains iden ti cal to it self; and (iv) eve ry thing changes. Only if these statements did not rest upon ir re duci ble mo dal points of en try they would have been contra dic tory.
The very na ture of (regu la tive) idea-knowledge, re fer ring us be yond the lim its of (con sti tu tive) concept-formation, should be seen as the ex pan sive bound ary of ra tio nal ity. 26 258 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(3) so on. Func tional terms such as these re late to the how of re al ity and not to its con crete what (see Strauss, 2003:69-74) . 24 Just re call Gödel's ref er ence to a "mul ti tude of x's" which could be para phrased but not de fined be cause ev ery def i ni tion would lean upon our aware ness of a dis crete quan tity (dis tinct mul ti plic ity). 25 In Strauss, 2002b it is ex plained why the mean ing of con tin u ous ex ten sion, by con trast, en tails the aware ness of a gapless connectedness, which is syn on y mous to the no tion of co her ence and the orig i nal mean ing of the whole-parts re la tion ship. If all the parts are con nected (co here) they con sti tute the whole/to tal ity. 26 The term "con sti tu tive" is meant in the sense of "build ing blocks," whereas "reg u la tive" in di cates the deep en ing and ex pan sive func tion of con cept-tran scend ing knowl edge.
What lies between the restrictive and expansive boundaries of rationality?
We have fol lowed up the sug ges tion made by Ber nays, namely that the mean ing of ration al ity ought to be re lated to the na ture, scope and lim its of concept-formation and we have done that by high light ing the re stric tive and ex pan sive bounda ries of ra tion ality. But what is the status of the "in-between," of the in trin sic do main of ra tion al ity, the do main of logi cal ity? Our con jec ture is that this do main of logi cal ity evinces a three fold self-insufficiency: (i) it ex presses its unique mean ing only in co her ence with all the non-logical do mains of re al ity; (ii) it re fers be yond it self to grounds tran scend ing the realm of logi cal ity; (iii) it can only func tion upon the ba sis of a direction-giving ul ti mate hu man ori en tation in life, an ul ti mate com mit ment.
Ana lyz ing these con jec tures in all their de tail and con se quences will by far transcend the scope of this ar ti cle. Yet some brief out lines will be de vel oped.
The gen er ally ac cepted in sight that the va lid ity of an ar gu ment ought to be dis tinguished from its truth left many phi loso phers with the im pres sion that as soon as one gets in volved in the par ticu lars of logi cal in fer ence one has ar rived in a world of pure think ing, stripped from any con nec tion with the "outer world." Both predi cate logic and propo si tional (for mal) logic seems to be op er at ing only on the ba sis of the logi cal prin ci ples of iden tity, (non-)con tra dic tion and the ex cluded mid dle. For ex am ple, if one looks at the de duc tive syl lo gism in its four modes, while con sid er ing that there are four kinds of propo si tions in volved -uni ver sal af firma tive [A] and uni ver sal nega tive [E] / par ticu lar af firma tive [I] and par ticu lar nega tive [O] -and then ask two questions: (a) how many in fer ence pat terns are there? and (b) how many of these con sti tute valid in fer ences? -then it is clear that of the 256 pos si bili ties only a lim ited number are valid (if my rec ol lec tion is cor rect, about 21). In or der to dif fer en ti ate be tween valid and invalid in fer ences an im plicit or ex plicit use of the logi cal prin ci ples of identity and non-contradiction is re quired. Only on this ba sis is it pos si ble to evalu ate a par ticu lar in fer ence as be ing logi cally sound or as be ing il logi cal. But this con sti tutes a nor ma tive con trary -only hu man be ings with an ac counta bly free will are able to act in con for mity with logi cal prin ci ples or are ca pa ble of vio lat ing such prin ci ples. Also the do main of propo si tional logic pre-supposes the said logi cal prin ci ples.
The en tire dis tinc tion be tween sub ject and predi cate -in its logi cal sense -is depend ent upon the na ture of con cepts and concept-formation. Predi cates nor mally ex plicate traits brought to gether in the unity of a con cept. What ever prop erty is ex cluded from the logi cal unity of the con cept can not af ter wards be predi cated of it, ac cept in an il logi cal way. If it would have been true that the con cept "(ma te rial) body" ex cludes the prop erty of weight (mass) to be gin with 27 -as Im manuel Kant as serts in his Critique of Pure Rea son (1787, B:10 ff.) -then the so-called "syn thetic" propo si tion: "all 27 Since the dis cov ery of ir ra tio nal num bers the switch to space as the o ret i cal point of en try to re al ity estab lished a pow er ful and long-stand ing tra di tion which is still op er a tive in the thought of Des cartes (res extensa) and Kant -as it is clearly seen in their shared con vic tion that a ma te rial body is exhaustively char ac ter ized by ex ten sion alone. Cf. Des cartes, Prin ci ples of Phi los o phy, Part II, II: "That the na ture of body con sists not in weight, hard ness, col our and the like, but in ex ten sion alone"; and Kant: "So, wenn ich von der Vorstellung eines Körpers das, was der Verstand davon denkt, als Substanz, Kraft, Teilbarkeit usw., imgleichen, was davon zur Empfindung gehört, als Undurchdringlichkeit, Härte, Farbe usw. Absondere, so bleibt mir aus dieser empirischen Anschauung noch etwas nämlich Ausdehnung und bod ies are heavy" would be il logi cal since it vio lates the prin ci ple of non-con tra diction.
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A con cept is con sti tuted as a logi cal unity in the mul ti plic ity of fea tures cap tured in this con cept and every con cept is sub ject to logi cal prin ci ples. The mean ing of the logi cal prin ci ples of iden tity and non-contradiction brings to light the in ti mate con nection be tween the origi nal mean ing of a quan ti ta tive unity and mul ti plic ity and a logi cal unity and mul ti plic ity (com pare the re mark of David Hil bert quoted above - Hil bert, 1970:199) . Clearly, through ba sic simi lari ties and dif fer ences the mean ing of the logical mode in ti mately co heres with the ar ith meti cal as pect. Within the logi cal mode of re al ity we find a logi cal unity and mul ti plic ity (par ticu larly ex em pli fied in conceptformation), which analogi cally re sem bles an origi nal ar ith meti cal unity and mul ti plicity. This shows that logic can not be "con tained within it self," since it brings to ex pression its unique mean ing only in co her ence with non-logical fac ets of re al ity (in this case the co her ence be tween the logical-analytical mode and the quan ti ta tive mode).
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Since the be gin ning of the 20 th cen tury the dis ci pline of logic ad vanced sig nifi cantly in elu ci dat ing the na ture of logi cal in fer ences. But in spite of all the fi nesses and in trica cies in volved in this de vel op ment, the mere ap pli ca tion of the prin ci ples of iden tity and non-contradiction can not as sert the truth of any prem ises or con clu sions. The funda men tal logi cal prin ci ple re fer ring logic be yond its con cern with the va lid ity of ar gumen ta tion is the one that was dis cov ered by Leib niz (prin cip ium ra tio nis suf fi cien tis). Schopen hauer sub jected this prin ci ple of suf fi cient rea son in 1813 to an ex ten sive inves ti ga tion. He called it the prin ci ple of suf fi cient ground of knowl edge (prin cip ium ra tio nis suf fi cien tis co gno scendi):
As such it as serts that, if a judge ment is to ex press a piece of knowl edge, it must have suf fi cient ground or rea son (Grund); by vir tue of this qual ity, it then re ceives the predi cate true. Truth is there fore the ref er ence of a judge ment to some thing dif fer ent there from. This some thing is called the ground or rea son of the judge ment (1813:156). In con nec tion with the na ture of en ergy-op er a tion we have al luded to the orig i nal phys i cal mean ing of the cause-ef fect re la tion (cau sal ity). Sim i lar to the an a log i cal appear ance of nu mer i cal unity and mul ti plic ity within the log i cal-an a lyt i cal mode this phys i cal mean ing of cau sa tion is also an a log i cally re flected within the log i cal mode in the dis tinc tion be tween log i cal grounds and log i cal ef fects (con clu sions). When ever pre mises and con clu sions con tra dict each other, the ap pli ca tion of the log i cal prin ciples of iden tity and non-con tra dic tion can only as sert that both can not be true -but they can not es tab lish which one in deed is true.
Yet, the mo ment an ap peal is made to some or other "rea son" or "ground" logic alone is robbed for ever to be the fi nal judge of ra tion al ity! The bat tle field has now 260 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(3) Ges talt" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1787:B-35).
["So, when I sep a rate from the rep re sen ta tion of a body what the un der stand ing thinks about it, such as sub stance, force, divisibility etc., and sim i larly what be longs to sen sa tion, such as im pe n e tra bil ity, hard ness, col our and the like, then in this em pir i cal in tu ition there is still some thing left, namely ex ten sion and form" (trans la tion by the au thor).] 28 It is there fore sig nif i cant that the prom i nent Ger man lo gi cians of the 19 th cen tury even tu ally turned this prop o si tion into an "an a lytic" state ment (Lotze, Windelband, Sigwart) . 29 Be cause the sta tus of the log i cal prin ci ple of the ex cluded mid dle is de pend ent upon the no tion of in finity one ac cepts (the so-called po ten tial or ac tual in fin ity), a more com pli cated anal y sis is re quired to account for it. Such an ac count is found in Strauss, 1991. switched, since di ver gent views of re al ity are now sud denly emerg ing as the main actors on the scene of ra tional in ter ac tion. What a par ticu lar thinker may con sid er to be a "suf fi cient ground" may be viewed by an other as an "in suf fi cient ground"! (i) Con flict ing views of re al ity re quire a more than logi cal cri te rion of truth and (ii) it rests upon an im por tant strat egy in or der to en able mean ing ful in ter ac tion be tween think ers com ing from di ver gent tra di tions.
Let us make a few brief re marks about these two is sues in re verse or der, com mencing with the strat egy re quired for ra tional in ter ac tion. Per haps as an ef fect of the ration al ist leg acy of the West our shared in tel lec tual tra di tion is highly ap pre cia tive of criti cal think ing. The En light en ment pe ri od ad vanced un der the as sur ance of the stance of criti cal think ing par ex cel lance. Al ready in the Pref ace to the first edi tion of his Cri tique of Pure Rea son (1781) Im manuel Kant ap pre ci ates his own time as the true age of criti cism. This spirit of radi cally ques tion ing eve ry thing re sounded quite re cently in the stimu lat ing and thought-provoking fi nal ad dress de liv ered to the Philosophi cal So ci ety of South ern Af rica (hosted at Rho des Uni ver sity in Gra ham stown, Janu ary 2003), when Gra ham Priest (from Aus tra lia) ad dressed the fi nal ple nary session on the theme "What is Phi loso phy"? He made a well-argued plea for the view that the ul ti mate task of phi loso phy is to be radi cally criti cal in ques tion ing what ever there is. But let us first re turn to Kant, who writes:
Our age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criti cism, and eve ry thing must sub mit to it. Re lig ion, on the strength of its sanc tity, and law on the strength of its maj esty, try to with draw them selves from it; but by do ing so they arouse just sus pi cions, and can not claim that sin cere re spect which rea son pays to those only who have been able to stand its free and open ex ami na tion (Kant, 1871:A-12 -trans la tion F.M. Mül ler). In or der to be able to really bene fit from the ex er cise of a criti cal spirit, one has to observe some thing more fun da men tal than cri tique: show ing soli dar ity. It is in deed much more dif fi cult to high light what a par ticu lar thinker dis cov ered, a state of af fairs we still have to ac count for al beit in terms of a dif fer ent per spec tive. In other words, if I want to criti cize Plato, Ar is totle or Kant, I have to be able to ap pre ci ate posi tively what they have un veiled bef ore it is mean ing ful to criti cize the way in which they have ac counted for their dis cov ery. For ex am ple, ear lier in this ar ti cle we have ap pre ci ated posi tively the fact that Ar is totle cor rectly dis cov ered that concept-formation is bound to uni ver sal traits bef ore we have criti cized his ra tion al is tic re stric tion of knowl edge to con cep tual knowl edge.
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On the ba sis of a genu ine sense of soli dar ity, the sec ond best thing to do in serv ice of a mean ing ful and con struc tive criti cal en coun ter is to ex er cise im ma nent criti cism.
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This will pre vent the con vers ing part ners to end their in ter ac tion with the pro ver bial: "I say this and you say that, so what?" An in ner con tact of thought re quires the in tel -lec tual in teg rity of im ma nent criti cism. Its aim should al ways be first to show what is in her ently un ten able and only then to pro ceed with the for mu la tion of an al ter na tive per spec tive. At that point, in turn, the con ver sa tion part ner first has to ap pre ci ate the in con sis ten cies pointed out by the im ma nent criti cism, 32 then pro ceed to an ap pre ciation of what is posi tive in the al ter na tive ac count bef ore re newed criti cism could be raised.
This brings us to the first point: the re quire ment of a more than logi cal cri te rion of truth. Ob serv ing the logi cal prin ci ple of non-contradiction en ables one to dis cern contra dic tions. Con fus ing two spa tial fig ures -such as a "round square" -merely yields a logi cal con tra dic tion. How ever, when a theo reti cal at tempt is made to re duce two on tic do mains to each other (just re call the ex am ple of Achil les and the tor toise) the clash be tween kine mati cal laws of mo tion and spa tial laws leads to a real an tin omy, i.e., to a genu ine clash of laws. The lit eral mean ing of the word an tin omy is af ter all a clash of laws (anti = against; no mos = law). Every at tempt to re duce what is ir re duci ble in evita bly ends in such an tino mies -as we have showed above in con nec tion with primi tive terms and the limi ta tions of concept-formation and defi ni tion.
Since a clash of laws con cerns ir re duci ble spheres (modes) of laws (or: lawspheres), an an tin omy al ways re lates to an inter-modal con fu sion (in the case of Zeno: a con fu sion of static spa tial po si tions with uni form phoro nomic flow). The stance taken by a marx ist physi cist, Hörz, in di rectly dem on strates this is sue in a neat way. Acc cord ing to him clas si cal phys ics (New ton and his suc ces sors) teaches that a moving body finds it self at a spe cific point in time at a spe cific place. But if this is the case, he con tin ues, it will be im pos si ble to gain an un der stand ing of true move ment. As an al ter na tive Hörz there fore chooses for the con cep tion of mo tion de vel oped by Engels. In the dialectical-materialistic con cep tion of the lat ter one can say that a moving body which is en gaged in a change of place at the same time is and is not at a specific place. Hörz ex plains the in ner ten sion ("dia lec tics") of this po si tion as fol lows:
in so far as the body changes from one place to an other it moves, and it reaches, as a re sult of its move ment, al ways at a spe cific time a spe cific place (1967:58) . This is, ac cord ing to him, the "dia lec ti cal an tin omy (Wid er spruch)" of change of place. A for mu la tion pre clud ing every logi cal con tra dic tion runs as fol lows: "as the re sult of move ment a body finds it self at a spe cific place and with re gard to the movement it self the body does not find it self at a spe cific place" (Hörz, 1967:58) . The implicit as sump tion of this as ser tion of the "non-contradictory" re la tion ship be tween move ment and place is the ir re duci bil ity of the law-spheres of space and move ment.
A mere ap peal to logi cal prin ci ples does not safe-guard any one from be com ing a vic tim of (an tinomi cally) re duc ing one of these two spheres to the other. Just con sid er the ac count given by Von Kibéd of the im pos si bil ity of mo tion in terms of the logi cal prin ci ple of iden tity.
The prin ci ple of iden tity, ac cord ing to which ev ery thing is only iden ti cal to itself, ac tu ally for bids ev ery change, ev ery be com ing-dif fer ent, ev ery stepping-out side of a sub stance from its be ing-it self (1979:59). Ac cord ing to Von Kibéd the clas si cal meta phys i cal es cape-route, namely to dis tinguish be tween es sence and ap pear ance, won't help us: "The dif fi cul ties ac com pa ny ing the con cept of the changes of an un change able thing are side-stepped by di vid ing the en tity into an es sen tial and ac ci den tal part, thus pro duc ing the pos si bil ity to as so ci ate un changeability with its es sence and change ability with what is ac ci den tal" (Von Kibéd, 1979:60) .
How ever, this is of no help ei ther, be cause also the ac ci den tal fea tures of an en tity are sub ject to the law of iden tity: "ac cord ing to the prin ci ple of iden tity also the ac ciden tal must re main iden ti cal to it self and can not abol ish its es sence, which is given in its ac ci den tal na ture " (1979:60) . His con clu sion is there fore to be ex pected: "The concept of change is there fore logi cally untink able " (1979:60) . 33 What is ab sent in this ar gu ment are the suf fi cient grounds ac count ing for the ir reduci bil ity of con stancy and change. Merely ap ply ing the logi cal prin ci ple of iden tity sim ply does not solve the prob lem and in ad di tion, in the case of Von Kibéd, un derscores the an tin omy en tailed in every at tempt to re duce change and con stancy to a static "un change abil ity"!
34
The more-than-logical, inter-modal (cos mic) prin ci ple at stake in this con text should be des ig nated as the prin ci ple of the ex cluded an tin omy since it finds its roots in a non-re duc tion istic on tol ogy.
Trust (faith) in rationality?
In his criti cal ra tion al ism Pop per radi cally criti cizes an un criti cal or com pre hen sive ra tion al ism which is based upon "the prin ci ple that any as sump tion which can not be sup ported ei ther by ar gu ment or by ex pe ri ence is to be dis carded" (Pop per, 1966-II:230) . Pop per ar gues that this kind of ra tion al ism is de mon stra bly in con sis tent, i.e., in terms of its own cri te ria. In a sense Pop per for mu lated a cri tique on foun da tion alism: since "all ar gu ments must pro ceed from as sump tions, it is plainly im pos si ble to de mand that all as sump tions should be based on ar gu ment" (Pop per, 1966-II:230) . Pop per is aware of the fact that be hind the idea of an "as sump tion less" ap proach a huge as sump tion hides it self -some thing even tu ally also criti cized by Gada mer in his mock ing of the preju dice of En light en ment against preju dices (cf. Gada mer, 1998:276) .
His own po si tion une quivo cally dem on strates his in sight in the self-insufficiency of "ra tion al ity." He knows that the ra tion al is tic trust in rea son is not ra tional it self and he ex plic itly speaks about "an ir ra tional faith in rea son" -which means that ac cord ing to him "ra tion al ism is nec es sar ily far from com pre hen sive or self-contained" (Pop per, 1966-II:231) .
Steg mül ler holds a simi lar con vic tion when he says that a self-guarantee of hu man think ing does not ex ist in any do main -one al ready has to be lieve in some thing in order to jus tify some thing else (Steg mül ler, 1969:314) . These view points are sup ported from a dif fer ent an gle when De Vleeschauwer says:
33 What is needed in or der to ac count for change, namely "the con cept of cau sal ity, is log i cally seen non-trans par ent and shows the lim its of log i cal ex pla na tion" (Von Kibéd, 1979:60-61) . 34 Prinsloo has a clear un der stand ing of the short com ings of reductionism. He has a solid un der stand ing of the fact that "we can not ex plain move ment by re duc ing it to rest or dy na mism in terms of a static state" (Prinsloo, 1989:98) . This is sue is treated in more de tail in the "Festschrift" ded i cated to E.D. Prinsloomy con tri bu tion is en ti tled: "Di a lec tics and logi cality: Be tween cul tural di ver sity and ontical uni ver sality."
A sci ence with out any 'pr esu pp os itions' is there fore purely from a ra tional stand point im pos si ble. The last re al ity to wards which epis te mol ogy drives us, is an act of faith in think ing ...
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The trust in the hu man ca pac ity to think and to ar gue un der scores that also from this per spec tive "ra tio nal ity" does not have the first and the last word in die life of hu man be ings. Hu man life in deed knows a mul ti plic ity of re la tion ships built upon trust and con fi dence. Derrida men tions a dif fer ent in stance when he re fers to credit against the back ground of ac knowl edg ing the uni ver sal ity of "faith." He stresses that "faith is abso lutely uni ver sal" (1997:22) and then con tin ues to say: There is no so ci ety with out faith, with out trust in the other. Even if I abuse this, if I lie or if I com mit per jury, if I am vio lent be cause of this faith, even on the eco nomic level, there is no so ci ety with out this faith, this mini mal act of faith. What one calls credit in capi tal ism, in eco nom ics, has to do with faith, and the econo mists know that. But this faith is not and should not be re duced or de fined by re lig ion as such (1997:23) . That the vari ous forms of trust in hu man life in the fi nal analy sis con verge in a direction-giving ul ti mate com mit ment will be left at this mere hint.
Concluding remark
Our analy sis aimed at bring ing to light both the re stric tive and the ex pan sive boundaries of ra tion al ity -evinced in the "co her ence of ir re duci bles" and the en tailed awareness of primi tive terms in their in de fin abil ity on the one hand and in those kinds of knowl edge tran scend ing the lim its of concept-formation on the other. We have only briefly paid at ten tion to the place of logi cal in fer ences but had to men tion that even the most ba sic logi cal prin ci ples point at the self-insufficiency of logi cal think ing. The prin ci ple of suf fi cient rea son adds weight to the de pend ence of logi cal ar gu men ta tion upon the grounds (rea sons) which stem from a more-than-logical re al ity.
Our analy sis did not en ter into a more re fined dis cus sion of the way in which the logical-analytical mode ex presses its mean ing in co her ence with other mo dal do mains of re al ity and there fore also did not pay at ten tion to the cru cial is sue re gard ing the rela tion ship be tween thought, lan guage and meta pho ric ity.
What did clearly sur face is the aware ness that ra tion al ity is em bed ded in and bor ders upon giv ens which are not open to fur ther "ra tional" ex plo ra tion -giv ens that both con di tion (in a con sti tu tive sense) and tran scend the lim its of con cep tual knowl edge. In the last sec tion it was suc cinctly ar gued that the ra tional fac ulty of the hu man be ing rests upon trust -con verg ing in an ul ti mate life-commitment which also guides and directs other forms of trust in hu man life.
Tak ing into ac count the many-sided con nec tions with "more-than-rational" boundaries of and con di tions for ra tion al ity, we have to con clude that ra tion al ity as such appears not to be all too "ra tional" af ter all. Its mean ing only comes to ex pres sion in its co her ence with a more-than-rational (given) cos mic di ver sity. The con struc tive ca pacity of hu man think ing, its abil ity to ac quire knowl edge through nor med sub jec tive acts of ob jec ti fi ca tion, con sti tutes its crea tive call ing which should not be ap pre ci ated as
